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MEN ARE NOT ANGELS:
THE REALPOLITIK OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT*
ERIC LANE**

I. INTRODUCTION

My task is to compare the processes of American representative democracy, or deliberative democracy, with those of direct

democracy, or direct initiative lawmaking. By direct democracy
I mean a form of lawmaking that allows a state's citizens to initiate amendments to statutes or constitutions for public consideration through a referendum. Included within this definition are
systems that permit opportunity for legislative action prior to a
referendum.
Comparing representative democracy and direct democracy
involves more than an acontextual analysis of the steps in each
process. Lawmaking processes are the exercise of real power.
They regulate behavior, redistribute wealth, and indicate who
has power in society. They also relate our own history and offer
views of human conduct. "[W]hat is government itself," Madison wrote, "but the greatest of all reflections on human nature."1
To compare these processes, we must explore not only their
* A preliminary version of this Essay was presented at Willamette Law Review's Initiative Symposium held in February 1998.
** Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public Law and Public Service at
Hofstra University School of Law. Co-author with the Honorable Abner J. Mikva of
The Legislative Process (1995) and An Introduction to Statutory Interpretationand the
Legislative Process (1997).
I thank Willamette Law Review's editors for the opportunity to speak at the Symposium and to develop my thinking about initiative and legislative processes. I would
also like to thank Professor Hans Linde for his ever keen and practical insights and
Joyce Talmadge, Fritz Schwarz, and Karen Burstein for providing comments on the
text. Two Hofstra law students, Elaine Sammon and Diane Corrigan, provided extremely valuable research assistance. Finally, as always, I must thank Hofstra Law
School and its Dean, Stuart Rabinowitz, for their generous support of this effort.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
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steps, but their purposes and underlying premises.
Although limited to twenty-four states, direct democracy affects us all.2 American direct democracy, as it has evolved and
most recently has been used, is a criticism of representative democracy-the form of government under which we all live. Proponents of direct democracy see it as the tonic for the ills of representative democracy.
Direct democracy is a product of the Progressive Movement, which sought to limit the power of increasingly powerful
state legislatures at the end of the Nineteenth and beginning of
the Twentieth Centuries. It is also the product of an incorrect
utopian view of human conduct. Simply put, Americans left to
their own devices do not know and cannot champion the public
good over their own views or interests. Left by themselves, people usually and naturally regard the public good as synonymous
with their own views or interests. Pursuing these views or interests leaves them little time or opportunity to do more.
If true, this view of human conduct strips direct democracy
of its virtue and exposes it as a process through which people can
pursue their goals without any of the deliberative or representative protections afforded by indirect democracy. It provides no
protection from the majority's impatient, heated, or foolish will,
nor, perhaps to Madison's surprise, does it protect against an organized minority. Absent from this process is the representative,
accessible, and deliberate characteristics of even the worst
American legislatures.
Despite this view of direct democracy, which leads me to
oppose its institution in any state, I cannot imagine a state easily
abandoning it. Thus, arguing for an end to direct initiatives in
states that have them is not useful. Instead, I suggest changes to
the direct initiative processes that may afford more protection
from its greatest dangers.
In making various comparisons between the processes of direct and representative democracy, I heed the advice of Machiavelli: "[S]ince my intention is to say something that will
prove of practical use to the inquirer, I have thought it proper to
represent things as they are in real truth rather than they are

2. Tables A and B set forth as an Appendix to this Essay reflect states that have
forms of direct democracy and the petition and voting requirements for each.

19981

MEN ARE NOT ANGELS

imagined." 3 Despite my commitment to representative government,4 I am not a legislative rococoist attempting to beautify
something ugly. In 1997, I wrote about my beloved New York
State legislature, where I served as the Senate Democrats' chief
counsel for six years:
The Legislature's practices violate every principle of good
lawmaking: they exclude most of the people's elected legislators from the process, squelch deliberation and the injection
of new ideas, and deny the people any meaningful say in legislation or even the information they need to hold their
elected officials accountable. 5
I emphasize this point because I share Professor Richard
Briffault's concern that any comparison with the legislative
process has to be with actual lawmaking, not an idealized
model.6 But with imperfect legislative processes as the point of
comparison, direct democracy still does not provide procedures
as accessible or deliberative as representative democracy.
II. WHY ARE WE TALKING ABOUT THIS?

Twenty-four state constitutions authorize direct initiative
lawmaking authority. Of these states, nineteen adopted their
initiative lawmaking authorization during the Progressive Period.7 One of these states, Montana, adopted the authority for
direct statutory amendments in 1906 and for direct constitutional
amendments in 1972.8
In almost all of these states, direct democracy is an easy
process. The signature requirements are low, and enactment requires only a majority of those voting on the question. In Oregon, for example, statutory amendment by initiative requires a
petition signed "by a number of qualified voters equal to six percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for GovNICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 90 (Penguin ed., 1981).
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS XXIV (1995)
[hereinafter MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS]; ABNER J.MIKVA & ERIC
LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 189 (1997).
5. Eric Lane, Albany's Travesty of Democracy, 7 THE CITY J. 49 (1997).
6. See Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347 (1985).
3.
4.

7. See infra text accompanying notes 20-31.

8. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH OFFICE, CITIZEN INITIATIVE PROPOSALS APPEAR ON STATE BALLOTS 1976-1992 26 (1995) (hereinafter CRS REPORT).
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ernor at the election at which a Governor was elected for a term
of four years next preceding the filing of the petition." 9 That
number changes to eight percent for direct amendment of the
Oregon constitution.0 Additionally, either type of initiative becomes law on the basis of the support of a majority of those
casting their votes, not on the basis of a majority of those registered to vote." On the other hand, for the legislature to enact a
statute in Oregon, the constitution, like those of most states, requires the votes of a majority of its entire membership."
In Wyoming, a state in which an initiative process was
adopted in 1968, signatures equaling fifteen percent of qualified
voters and a majority of the total number of voters voting in the
election is required."
However, this Symposium is not concerned with the number
of states authorizing initiative lawmaking or the details of their
processes. Rather, it is concerned with the increase in the use of
initiatives during the last twenty years to enact controversial
policies into law. Between 1976 and 1992, there were 414 attempts to amend either statutes or constitutions through direct
initiatives, 176 (42.5%) of which passed. This number of initiatives is about two-and-one-half times the number of initiatives
(165) occurring between 1958 and 1975.14 Furthermore, the
number of initiatives is rising dramatically. For example, according to the New York Times, there were ninety citizens' initiatives in 1996 alone.15
More importantly, the initiatives of the last several decades
have included an increasing number of controversial topics as
initiative supporters have become dissatisfied with a perceived
failure of legislatures to enact their programs into law. Such
programs have included initiatives affecting voters' rights, gays,
immigrants, taxpayers, minorities, crime victims, and the termi9. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(b).
10. Id.
11. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(3)(b).
12. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
13. See Table A set forth in the Appendix.
14. CRS REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. By way of further comparison, during the
18 years (1904-1921) in which the direct initiative process was being adopted by the
bulk of states that now authorize it, 357 attempts at direct initiatives occurred.
15. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Voters Facing a Record Year for Initiatives, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24,1996, at Al.
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nally ill. Initiatives also have addressed auto insurance rights,
abortion, and language. Such activity raises concerns over the
initiative lawmaking process.
The cost and professionalization of the initiative process has
created additional concerns. Initiatives are now a business, in
which the people's role is almost insignificant. This view is typified by an observation from the Denver Post:
[T]he notion of the initiative as a populist tool against the
monied interest has been turned on its head in Colorado in
the past decade since the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
state law that prohibited paying people to circulate such petitions ....
There is a great deal of irony in using paid professionals to put a measure on the ballot that would devastate
nonprofit and charitable groups. Hiram Johnson must be
spinning in his grave to see the initiative process turned
against the very grassroots organizations the Progressives
sought to empower.
Similarly, USA Today reported that more than $200 million
was spent on initiatives in 1996, primarily for paid petitioners
and television advertising, 7 while the Cincinnati Enquirer reported that proponents of an initiative to legalize casino gambling "spent about $5.4 million, including $2.7 million to produce
and air TV commercials. The rest went to circulate petitions to
get the initiatives on the ballot and
18 pay for campaign literature,
lawyers, consultants and polling.
Not only do business interests resort to paid petition circulators, or bounty hunters, government reform groups such as
Common Cause and the League of Women Voters have also relied on bounty hunters for their signatures.' 9 This use of bounty
hunters, who usually reside outside the state, can be quite seamy.
To illustrate, a Denver Post editorial revealed an effort to garner
signatures by state term limit supporters who supported a national constitutional convention, explaining:
16.

Bob Ewegen, De Tocqueville's America is Alive and Well in Colorado,

DENVER POST, Oct. 14, 1996, at Bll. The Supreme Court decision referred to is
Meyer v. Grant,486 U.S. 414 (1988).
17.

Bill Varner, Citizens Initiate a Record 94 Ballot Questions, USA TODAY,

Oct. 17, 1996, at 4A.
18. Sandy Theis, Gambling Backers Have Money on Their Side, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Oct. 25, 1996, at Al.
19. Ernest Tollerson, Hired Hands Carrying Democracy's Petitions,N.Y. TIMES
July 9, 1996, at Al.
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Testimony in trial to determine if the "con-con" initiative
would be placed on the ballot demonstrated that paid petition circulators financed by the out of state interests who
bankrolled this latest drive repeatedly glossed over the fact
that it called for a U.S. constitutional convention. Instead,
citizens testified that they were only told that they were
signing a petition supporting term limits."
III. A HISTORICAL DEFINITION OF INITIATIVES
The direct initiative is a product of an explosive period in
American history referred to as the Progressive Period. Some
description of this period is needed to provide a context for understanding the purposes and underlying premises of direct democracy in the states in which it was then adopted.
This was a period of great social turbulence as the country
began its transformation from rural to urban, agrarian-mercantile to industrial, aristocratic to democratic, small to large, slow
to fast, middle class to working class or peasant, Anglo-Saxon to
European, Protestant to a mixture of religions, and religious to
secular. An economic tradition that, at least in theory, defined
success based on personal character changed to a tradition that
based success on strength and guile alone. Finally, the country
changed from a political tradition that claimed to honor the disinterested citizen government participant to a system where
gaining a piece of the pie through parties, bosses, legislatures,
and political professionals became an accepted approach to gov21
ernance.
From this period flow at least two narratives. The first is
the tale of the small farmer trampled by the robber barons, the
civility and community of rural life fatally soiled by the dirt and
materialism of urban life, the craftsmen overrun by new technology, and the civic-minded smitten by the self-interested in both
economic and political spheres.
The second is the tale of nativist opposition to immigrant
masses, Protestants opposed to Catholics and Jews, and, as for-

20. Editorial, DENVER POST, Sept. 1, 1996, at F2 (emphasis in original).
21. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 9-11 (1955); see generally MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS

(1990); ROBERT H.
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1995).
DEMOCRATIC WISH

(1962);

JAMES A. MORONE, THE

WIEBE, SELF RULE:

A

CULTURAL HISTORY
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mer slaves spread throughout the country, whites against blacks.
Old wealth resented new wealth, and those with economic and
political power oppressed those without. In short, the defenders
of the existing faith battled against change.
During this period, lawmaking transformed from active
This
courts and quiescent legislatures to active legislatures."
economic
and
social
the
of
demands
the
change reflected
changes just outlined. As America became crowded, diverse,
and economically complex, individual efforts alone, at least for
an extraordinarily large percentage of the population, no longer
sufficed. Organization of interests became essential for the protection and advancement of the people. In this environment of
limitation, competition between such organizations or groups for
resources and opportunities became endemic.
According to legal historian Lawrence Friedman: "Organization was a law of life, not merely because life was so complicated, but also because life seemed to be a competitive struggle,
jungle warfare over limited resources...."3 Legislation flourished in these conditions. As Willard Hurst observed:
Legislation bulked larger in social regulation when more numerous and varied interests began to press claims for attention, and when politically effective opinion sensed a need to
bring more factors into policy calculations. In that context
both petitioners and lawmakers began to realize the process
implications of the open-door jurisdiction of the legislative
to the narrower avenues of access to judibranch in contrast
cial lawmaking. 21
This transformation of lawmaking also has its opposing narratives. The first is the tale of corrupt state legislatures populated by illiterate representatives and controlled by party leaders
and robber barons such as Jay Gould, who supposedly bragged,
"I wanted the legislatures of four states, so I made them with my
own money."25
The second tale concerns a loss of power and prestige by the
nation's long dominant Protestant economic and political lead22.
23.

See MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 5-12.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 339 (2d ed.

1985).
24. J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 12 (1982) (footnote omit25.

MORONE, supra note 21, at 107.

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:579

ers. As described by historian Richard Hofstadter: "Progressivism, in short, was to a very considerable extent led by men
who suffered from the events of their time not through a shrinkage in their means but through the changed pattern in the distribution of deference and power."26 These men included the
members of the bench and bar who were vested in the judgemade law of their time and often horrified by changes brought
by statutory law." As explained by Roscoe Pound: "It is fashionable to point out the deficiencies of legislation and to declare
that there are things that legislators cannot do try how they will.
It is fashionable to preach the superiority of judge-made law
,,28

Regardless of one's interpretation of this transformation,
the thrust of the Progressives' political agenda, which included
direct democracy, was to weaken the growing legislative
strength. Professor Morone described their agenda aptly: "[The
Progressives'] democratic reforms were all aimed at minimizing,
even spurning, the role of the representative intermediaries that
legislastood between the public and its government-parties,
29
tors, private interests, ultimately politics itself.,
IV. "THE GREATEST OF ALL REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE"
The direct democracy movement was not, at least in its advocacy, simply a nihilistic attack on the reigning institutions of
power. It was not posited merely as an alternative to representative democracy, but as means for capturing the civic spirit of
American citizens. Premised on a view of human conduct unlike
that of representative democracy, "[i]t was not," according to
Professor Morone, "merely a negative vision, restricted to razing
the party state. Along with popular participation came the restoration of the classic republican constituency. Reformers would
26. HOFSTADTER, supra note 21, at 135.
27. See MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 12-13.
28. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 38384 (1908) (footnotes omitted).
29. MORONE, supra note 21, at 112. The adoption of direct democracy in Oregon is part of this story, although each state has its own unique political history. As
Morone explained: "At the close of the nineteenth century, Oregon [had] many of the
prerequisites for progressive reform: a widely-shared belief that existing political institutions were corrupt; an organized cadre with access to well defined radical ideas; and
a population familiar with and receptive to these ideas." Id.
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put Madison aside."3 Understanding what it means to "put
Madison aside" is fundamental to comparing representative democracy and direct democracy. It references the idea that government is the greatest reflection on human nature. To "put
Madison aside," then, means to put Madison's view of human
nature aside and substitute a view of human nature justifying direct democracy.
What is Madison's need-to-be-disposed-of view? Simply
put, it is that individuals within society organize themselves into
factions to advance their individual interests and passions. The
term "passion" refers to noneconomic interests such as religion
or ideology. 1 Factions are groups "who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 32 In
The Federalist No. 10, Madison expressed the view of human
conduct on which our system of representative democracy is
based:
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of
man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of
civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning Government and many other points, as well
of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or
to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong
is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities,
that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most
frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent
conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
It is this view of human conduct that had to be "put aside"
30. Id.
31. See generally Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not Republican
Government. The CampaignAgainst Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19-45 (1993).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
33. Id. at 58-59.

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:579

by the advocates of direct democracy in order to justify the very
form of government Madison and the other Framers believed
would result in the triumph of passions and interests. To acknowledge the Madisonian view of human conduct would have
meant that the Progressives were advocating a system in which
people's narrow interests and passions would triumph. To avoid
this consequence, they returned to the same romantic image of
man popularized by the radical Whig republicans to contest
British rule at the time of Independence and rejected by the
framers as untrue. This was the rustic, sturdy yeoman-frugal,
industrious, temperate, and simple.34 And its Progressive Period
progeny was John Q. Public, the Average Man, the Man of
Good Will, the Forgotten Man possessing all of the virtues of the
sturdy yeoman plus more. As Professor Hofstadter described
him:
His approach to politics was, in a sense, individualistic: He
would study the issues and think them through, rather than
learn them through pursuing his needs. Furthermore, it was
assumed that somehow he would be really capable of informing himself in ample detail about the many issues that he
would come to pass on, and that he could master their intricacies sufficiently to pass intelligent judgment.35
Therein lies the premise for direct democracy. A man, John
Q. Public, possesses the inclination and time to participate continuously in the lawmaking of his nation, state, or locality and is
able to discern
3 6 and pursue the common good without regard to
self-interest.
This view of human nature was the wave upon which the
ship Progressivepredictably foundered. John Q. Public, as used
by the Progressives, was a necessary construct to rationalize a
government that conflicted with representative democracy. As
Hofstadter wrote: "Without such assumptions the entire movement for such reforms as the initiative and referendum ...is
unintelligible. 37 As its supporters soon recognized, the move34. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, 48-53 (1969).
35. HOFSTADTER, supra note 21, at 259.
36. Self-interest is not limited to economic benefit. It includes one's view of the
world, whether it dictates support or opposition to term limits, gay rights, affirmative
action, or physician-assisted suicide. See Linde, supra note 31, at 19-45.
37. HOFSTADTER, supra note 21, at 259.
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ment quickly became unintelligible. Walter Lippmann, an early
advocate of the selfless man, best described this phenomenon in
stating:
In ordinary circumstances voters cannot be expected to transcend their particular, localized and self-regarding opinions.
[We might as] well expect men laboring in the valley to see
the land as from a mountain top. In their circumstances,
which as private persons they cannot readily surmount, the
voters are most likely to suppose that whatever seems obviously good to them must be good for the country, and good
in the sight of God."
Likewise, Hofstadter wrote:
Confronted by an array of technical questions, often phrased
in legal language, the voters shrank from the responsibilities
the new system attempted to put upon them. Small and
highly organized groups with plenty of funds and skillful
publicity could make use of these devices, but such were not
the results the proponents of initiative and referendum
sought; nor was the additional derationalization of politics
that came with the propaganda campaigns demanded by referendums.39
David Frohnmayer, one of Oregon's most prominent sons,
wrote of the most recent emergence of initiatives:
I hear an ancient noise rising in Oregon. To my ears it is a
raucous, ragged sound....
It is the reemergence of what I call tribal politics. We've
seen it breaking forth on a global scale recently.... And
we've seen it in the U.S., too, in a slightly different form, in
which the tribes are made of people who zealously support
narrowly focused political issues. In all my years as a public
servant, I've never seen the resulting enmity and anger as
strong as it is today in Oregon and throughout the nation.
This is a politics in which questions of who is right and who is
wrong pales beside the changes being wrought in the nature
of our public dialogue. We are seeing the growth of a politics
based upon narrow concerns, rooted in the exploitation division of class, cash, gender, region, ethnicity, morality and ideology-a give no quarter and take no prisoners activism that
demands satisfaction and accepts no compromise. I believe it

38. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 41 (2d ed. 1992).
39. HOFSTADTER, supra note 21, at 266.
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threatens our future. 40
In addition to John Q. Public's demasking, the corrupt railroad and robber baron legislatures of the last century have been
virtually eliminated. This does not mean that today's legislatures are free from direct corruption, or that campaign costs and
regulations have not had a corrupting effect on some legislators.
However, as legislative activity in every government level has
grown exponentially throughout this century because of the
public's demand for regulatory and redistributive changes,4' legislative corruption has diminished.42
Stripped of its underlying assumption of human nature, initiative lawmaking is an alternative lawmaking method used primarily by the impatient, and often intolerant, outcomists who
want their views to be law, no matter the cost. This may sound
harsh, but why else would someone undertake an initiative, but
to avoid the obstacles and delays built into our system of representative democracy?
Most people, of course, can point to an initiative-made law
that they supported, yet that failed in the legislature. I, for example, favor Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law and California's medical use of marijuana. But that is the point; these
are simply my policy goals that I want enacted into law. The
point of representative democracy is to make sure such policies
do not become law unless they are tested by a system that weighs
against change. Even the most procedurally deficient legislative
bodies provide more assurance of such fairness than an initiative
process that structurally separates us, discourages discourse, and
emphasizes outcome over process.
I would add one caveat to this point. As a result of my participation in drafting legislative district lines in 1981, I have argued that legislative districting should be outside the province of
40. David Frohnmayer, The New Tribalism, OLD OREGON, Autumn 1992, at 1619.
41. See MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 11-13.
42. Alan Rosenthal, the nation's leading scholar on state legislatures, premised
his book on state legislative ethics, by stating, "legislators and legislatures, on the
whole, are ethical bodies, considerably less corrupt than in earlier periods." ALAN
ROSENTHAL, DRAWING THE LINE, LEGISLATIVE ETHICS IN THE STATES 5 (1996).

My own experience in New York provides additional evidence for this observation.
During my six years as counsel to the New York State Senate Minority and in observing the state's processes for thirteen years, I did not observe any legislative misbehavior relating to the enactment process nor significant legislator misbehavior.
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legislative authority. In this exercise of legislative power, most
legislators fail to recognize interests outside their own. Indeed,
because of the unified legislative interest in protecting its own
positions from change, the legislative process in such cases denies the protections otherwise available to the public. According
to Professor Hans Linde, initiatives are useful in these structural
cases.43 This is an attractive idea, if, as discussed later, it is effected through a strenuous initiative system.
V.

THE OBSTACLES AND DELAYS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

What then are these obstacles and delays that make legislative bodies so unattractive to "initiators," and why are they part
of our lawmaking system? In outline, the process by which legislation is enacted is elementary and familiar. Elected legislators
introduce a proposed laws in the form of bills. Bills are sent to
committees and, if adopted, may reach the floor of the legislature. If passed there, they are sent to the other legislative
house " where the same process occurs. If an identical bill is
passed by both houses, it is sent to the executive. The executive
can either approve or veto the bill. If vetoed, the bill returns to
the legislature, which can override the veto by asupermajority.
Although accurate, this simplistic description is unrevealing.
The real legislative process is more like "a three-ring circus, with
action occurring everywhere and at the same time. 45 At each
phase of the enactment process, a bill's progress can be delayed
or halted. Advancement requires support from varying numbers
of legislative colleagues or coalitions of colleagues, who rarely
share each others' exact ideas, concerns, or constituencies. Winning support is the product of numerous factors, including persuasive debate, compromises, favors, trades, political contributions, and political force. Such activity is complicated, difficult
to observe, and often hard to digest.
Through this tortuous process, legislation is not only enacted, but legitimized by tempering naked group interests or, in
Frohnmayer's words, "tribal passions." These are the same in43. See Linde, supra note 31, at 19-45.
44. The federal and 49 state governments have bicameral legislatures. Nebraska
operates under a unicameral system.
45. ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY:
PROCESS PARTICIPATION AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 160 (1998).
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terests and passions that are left unchecked, encouraged, and
vindicated by direct democracy. This point is most important
because the function of our legislatures is not simply to enact
laws, but to arrive at consensus on the nature of demands that
ought to be addressed and the manner in which they ought to be
accommodated. It occurs through a process of conflict and compromise among broadly representative legislators.
This process is more important than any single statute. It is
also the most misunderstood goal of the system because of its
complexity and because of the difficulty of heralding process,
particularly a process that often leads to no action, over outcome. It is far easier to identify with and measure outcomes
than to understand the significance of a messy process that often
does not deliver what you want. As explained by Professor Alan
Rosenthal:
David Broder [a nationally syndicated columnist and Washington Post reporter]... admonished his colleagues for describing the essential characteristics of the legislative process
as failures of the system instead of remarking that they were
requisites for democracy. In his view, legislatures are "collecting points for conflicting views." The debate and the conflicts occur' as interests and agendas clash, he says, is healthy,
not pathological. "We ought not to make it appear as if debate and fights and even impasses are train wrecks," he cautioned his colleagues. Just as conflict [is] inevitable in legislative bodies, so is compromise .... "We don't have to trash
deal making; we don't have to trash people who change their
positions" .... "We have to be willing to sV that this is part
of the work of representative government."
The "essential characteristics" referred to by Rosenthal
were those intended to legitimize representative democracy.
These characteristics are representativeness, accessibility, and
deliberativeness. All have evolved through various means as the
attitudes and demographics of the country have changed, and all
are absent from direct democracy.
A. Representativeness
The fundamental and evident difference between direct and
indirect democracy is that in direct democracy the people vote
46. Id. at 2-3.
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directly for or against a law, while in indirect democracy, they
vote for representatives who exercise the legislative power on
their behalf. The framers purposefully selected representative
democracy. Representative democracy was necessary to govern
areas larger than towns or villa es and was intended "to refine
and enlarge the public view.",Y In a manner similar to town
meetings, representatives with different and competing voices
could be heard and a consensus developed. As Professor Philip
Frickey observed:
It would be useful, I think, to explode one myth-that direct
democracy today is somehow analogous to the old New
England-style town meeting. Colonial New England town
meetings involved the citizenry of very homogeneous little
towns. The only persons allowed to participate were property-owners, who were all of the same race, gender, and religious faith. These meetings were tightly run, to allow all entitled to speak to have an opportunity to do so. The meetings
were designed to promote consensus.
The need for such a system is greater now than at the beginning of the Republic. As the nation and its states have grown
and industrialized, the population has become more disparate in
its interests and passions. In such a setting, the importance of a
form of government that allows for the consideration of many
voices is essential to a fair and stable democracy. While the nation's legislatures are not perfectly reflective of the breadth of its
population or its interests, universal suffrage and the removal of
many obstacles to the exercise of the franchise have resulted in
far more representative legislatures. This in turn legitimizes
their decisions, but makes it more difficult to arrive at them.49
Direct democracy stands in direct contrast to this model,
and it thrives as a result of it. Frustrated by structural and other
obstacles (e.g., legislators who are usually less extreme than initiators), initiators can push their agendas through the initiative
processes. No deference need be paid to competing interests or
passions. A policy preference can become law in most states
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (J.
Cooke ed., 1961).
48. Philip Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government,
direct Democracy and the Privatizationof the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
421 (1998).
49. See generally MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at
365; ROSENTHAL, supra note 45, at 27-32.
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simply by a majority of those actually voting on the question 5°an often small amount. Additionally, because initiative voters
need only concern themselves with their own interests or passions, they have little exposure to competing ideas and context
for their votes. Legislators, on the other hand, must consider an
array of factors in arriving at their decisions, including: the views
of their colleagues and constituents; the historical setting for the
proposal; the impact on other regulatory or redistributive
schemes; and internal politics.
This isolation of initiative voters is often the goal of initiators. They want to reduce debate to emotional appeals and the
perceived basic self-interest of their potential supporters. As
Professor Julian Eule explained:
No one would be so naive as to deny that the deliberative
ideal breaks down with disturbing frequency. The legislature
often has trouble hearing voices from the margin. The Framers' vision, however, combined a deliberative idealismwhich inspired representative government-with a pluralistic
realism-which prompted cautionary checks....
The problem with substitutive democracy is different.
When naked preferences emerge from a plebiscite, it is not a
consequence of system breakdown. Naked preferences are
precisely what the system seeks to measure. Aggregation is
all that it cares about. The threat to minority rights and interests here is structural. This is how the system is supposed to
work.5"
Another aspect of representativeness is that it allows people
to pursue their own lives without dedicating the considerable ex50. See Appendix.
51. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1551 (1990). On this point, Derrick A. Bell, Jr. stated 20 years ago that the use of the
initiative raises voting rights issues-that is, it creates situations in which anti-minority
views are expressed through initiatives in states where minorities have gained legislative footholds. See Derrick A. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto Racial
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV 1, 13 (1978). As Bell explained:
Throughout this country's history, politicians have succumbed to the temptation to wage a campaign appealing to the desire of whites to dominate blacks.
More recently, however, the growing black vote has begun to have an impact
and even effected "Road to Damascus" conversions on more than a few political Pauls, some whom even claim "born again" experiences during midterm. This impact may be subverted if voting majorities may enact controversial legislation directly.
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tra resources necessary to participate meaningfully in direct democracy. Contrary to the view of the initiators, most people do
not have the necessary interest, time, experience, or knowledge
to understand some initiatives and participate in direct lawmaking. As Thomas Cronin wrote:
Direct democracy processes have not brought about rule by
the common people. Government by the people has been a
dream for many, but most Americans want their legislators
and other elected officials to represent them as best they can
and to make the vast bulk of public policy decisions.
Furthermore, as Professor Morone observed: "The ostensibly democratic device clearly favored educated voters who could
fathom the complex questions being put to them...."53 Even
this view may be too optimistic, according to the humorist Russell Baker:
Making sensible judgments on these things would have required bringing a lawyer and accountant into the booth with
me. Since there wasn't room enough for three I decided to
simplify the problem. So with my first vote, I pulled down
"yes" on all bond issues and "no" on all constitutional
amendments. Next election I reversed field: "yes" on all constitutional amendments; "no" on all bond issues.
For the most part, people need not concern themselves with
daily governance questions. Despite the criticism that legislators
do not know any more about legislation than initiative voters,
they possess substantially more knowledge about legislation than
voters do about initiatives. Professor Rosenthal's extensive
study of state legislators illustrated this point:
Legislators have far more information available to them
than do rank-and-file citizens. And they have far greater incentive to make use of it. Moreover, they have probably
worked with the issues in question longer, perhaps specializing by virtues of a standing committee assignment. They, or
trusted colleagues to whom they can turn, will know the ins
and outs of many of the issues that come before the legislature for resolution. Citizens, in contrast, are more apt to be
satisfied with their feelings than with the images and slogans

52. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 225 (1989).
53. MORONE, supra note 21, at 124.
54. Russell Baker, Tips for Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at 23.
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that get their attention.55
One source of information about which I can provide direct
testimony is staff briefings. During my tenure as Counsel to the
New York State Senate Democrats, every bill that was addressed
by a committee or the Senate was first briefed by the Counsel's
staff or the Office of the Committee on Finance and then shared
both in writing and orally with Democratic members of the Senate.
Legislators use this information to make judgments about
bills based on their own policy preferences. The phrase "their
own policy preferences" is not intended to spark debate over
whether legislators act as agents or trustees for their constituents. Although such a debate is valuable for framing discussions
of legislative activity from
16 a legislator's perspective, it is, for the
most part, meaningless. Legislators vote most often based on
the merits of an issue, and their judgments are usually quite
similar to the mainstream views of their constituents.57
A colleague at Hofstra Law School recently raised one final
point of comparison on representativeness. Does not the election of representatives suffer the same frailties as those of initiatives in that people know little about their representatives, vote
on the basis of party, money dominates, and meaningful debate
constitutes jargon, accusation, and institution bashing? Without
defending the vices of our election process, this question misses
two important points. First, legislators are elected and must be
re-elected to continue their positions. Their records are continuously monitored by a myriad of groups interested in legislative outcomes or procedures. Legislators are constantly judged
by their records, which also become part of any re-election campaign. Second, an election for a representative is only the first
step in a complex process for converting policies to laws. Voting
for an initiative, on the other hand, is the first and only step in
the initiative process.

55. ROSENTHAL, supra note 45, at 41.
56. See MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 503-07.
57. See id.; see generally JOHN C. WAHLKE ET AL., THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM
(1962); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1992); RoSENTHAL, supranote 45, at 9-11.
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B. Accessibility
The second legitimizing characteristic of the American legislative process is its accessibility or openness. Representative
government requires public accessibility to insure its accountability, responsibility, and integrity." When legislators introduce
legislation, they must think about its impact on constituents,
colleagues, and others within the legislative process. "Legislators are on record, not for everything they do, but for quite a lot.
They have to defend their records, justify their decisions in terms
of constituency interests, and fend off attack if their election is
contested."5 9 They also have to defend their views to their own
colleagues, the wider public, and posterity. This discourages
succumbing to personal prejudices, fears, insecurities, and ignorance. It also encourages legislators to justify their position in
terms acceptable to their colleagues, constituents, and the community.
Initiative lawmaking is inaccessible. The agenda is set by
individuals who want their views to become law and who have
no incentive to include people with different views in their
agenda setting. In creating a proposal, initiators must be loyal
only to their interests and interest groups. This allows initiators
to approach issues in a more extreme manner. No opportunity
exists for public engagement, only public reaction. Also, voting
occurs in the privacy of the voting booth where prejudices remain unchecked. As Professor Eule observed: "[V]oters register their decisions in the privacy of the voting booth. They are
unaccountable to others for their preferences and their biases.
Their individual commitment to a consistent and fair course of
conduct can neither be measured nor questioned."60 This can
make a big difference. As Professor William Adams, an advocate of homosexual civil rights laws, explained following the recent legislative defeat of such a law by the Dade County, Florida
58. These rights are formalized in constitutions and statutes that require, for
example, public notice of prospective legislative meetings and legislation, the maintenance of public journals of legislative votes, and open legislative meetings. See generally MIKVA & LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, supra note 4, Chs. 2,8.
59.

ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra

note 45, at 43.
60. Aaron Wildavsky, Representative vs. Direct Democracy: Excessive Initiatives, Too Short Terms, Too Little Respect for Politics and Politicians,THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 31, 34 (Summer 1992).
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legislature:
After the '77 defeat (of an anti-discrimination initiative)
many people left the community. It took twenty years for the
people in our community to feel even up to bringing it before
our legislative body again. Because what happens when you
lose the ballot measure.., is like people choose against you
in a closet. I knew the next day the seven people [members
of the legislature] that voted against me, and I knew that
there were opportunities for me to talk and explain to them
and also find out why you're against me. Is it because you
hate me, or is it because you're fearful of civil rights measures .... But at least if you don't hate me I can still feel that I
can be part of this community, and I can continue to try to
persuade you otherwise. When people who have been discriminated against wake up after a ballot measure, they know
that for some reason fifty-plus percent of their community
has decided they're not entitled to protection from discrimination. And it is important if you want those people to still
feel they're a part of the community, and if you still want
those people to feel they have a chance and a process to understand why it is these people voted against you. You don't
even know who they are. You don't know if it's the person
across the street. You don't know which of the five; which of
the ten people you see in the line at the grocery store voted
against you. And you don't know which of them responded
to the last minute brochure which always comes in these
campaigns at the last minute, saying, "gays are child molesters," "gays spread diseases," and things like that. Because
the votes change at the end, people perceive that some people believe that. And it has a deteriorating, corrosive effect
on community. It has a deteriorating, corrosive effect on the
belief that the system can be worked with, and that you can
get a response.
C. Deliberativeness
Deliberativeness is the third legitimizing characteristic of
representative lawmaking and the most undervalued. Deliberativeness is not debate, although debate may be a part of it. Deliberativeness defines those structures and steps of the legislative
process (e.g., bicameralism and the executive veto) that slow
61. William E. Adams, Jr., Remarks at the Willamette Law Review Symposium:
Redirected Democracy: An Evaluation of the Initiative Process (Feb. 28, 1998).
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legislative decision making and distance it from the immediacy
of legislators' and various constituencies' passions and desires.
Such slowness and screening thwarts the goals of initiators.
Their issue is paramount. Debating their issue's significance or
their proposed solutions is unimportant. Even after the initiative
is on the ballot, the only debate that occurs is an exchange of reductive war cries by both sides.
I offer one example from my own experience as Counsel to
York City Charter Revision Commission. The ComNew
the
mission was responsible for preparing a new charter proposal to
the public for referendum, which it accomplished by holding a
series of public meetings and hearings to engender public debate
and deliberation. Once the referendum campaign commenced,
the debate became: "save the city from unconstitutional government" against "don't let worms out of the can." The latter
position was graphically depicted by a television commercial
with live succulent night-crawlers escaping a soup can.
A successful deliberative system requires compromise. It is
not a zero-sum game. It tries to avoid clear winners and losers
and provides continuous hope that another day can bring a different result. Through compromise, bills advance, and the views
of competing groups and legislators are tempered and blended
together into a statute. Compromise builds consensus. While
mythic may be the person who stands on principle alone, from a
legislative perspective, "half a loaf" is almost always better than
none.
Compromise is also the product of legislative assemblage
where legislators become increasingly familiar with each other's
views and interests. In short, they come to appreciate other
policy views and interests. A former Speaker of the New York
State Assembly, Stanley Fink, described this process by stating:
I went to Albany as a New York City representative, to pursue an urban agenda. But through formal and informal interactions with my colleagues across the state, I began to recognize and appreciate the views and interests of representatives from other areas. The result of this education, was
that my advocacy for urban interests was frequently tempered by my understanding of its impact on the interest of
others.
62.

Interview with Stanley Fink in MODERN NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE
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On a national level, Tennessee Representative Zach Wamp,
who was a member of the firebrand House Republican Class of
'94, "went [to Congress] thinking that [it] was a bunch of greedy,
egotistical members who were out of touch." He later said, "As
a class our attitude has changed about Congress ....The general
membership of the class believes that members of Congress are
decent and good and without ulterior motives."63
In contrast, direct democracy does not allow for learning or
compromise. Once the petition process begins, the bill cannot
be changed. Initiative lawmaking is a zero-sum game. This intolerance for compromise reflects the initiator's goal of "my way
or the highway," and with enough money and manipulation, this
goal will be met. As Professor Magleby argued: "Voter decision
making in direct legislation is typically the result of snap judgments based upon superficial emotional appeals broadcast on
television. The legislative process is more deliberative, substantive, and rational." 64
VI. THE PARADOX OF THE COMPARISON

Bruce Merrill, a "longtime pollster and political observer at
Arizona State University," recently said, "The irony is [initiatives] were initially there to protect voters. It's actually become
the easiest way for any special-interest group to change the
law." 65 While the original purpose for initiatives is disputable,
there is little doubt they now serve various impatient special interests. Despite this fact, support for initiatives within initiative
states remains strong. However, in non-initiative states, the
pressure for introducing an initiative process is, at best, erratic.
One reason for such support is that public skepticism of legislatures and legislators remains high. For example, in its report on
Oregon's initiative lawmaking, the City Club of Portland wrote:
Polling in the national press makes clear that a large segment
of the public has lost confidence in federal and state legislators and in legislative processes. Legislators are seen as sub107, 118-19 (Gerald Benjamin & Robert T. Nakamura eds., 1991).
63. Carroll J. Doherty & Jeffrey L. Katz, FirebrandGOP Class of '94 Warms to
Life on the Inside, 56 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 155, 163 (1998).
64.

DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION 188 (1984).

65.

Chris Moeser, Limits Sought on Initiatives; Plan Hampers Voters, Foes Say,

THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 19, 1998, at Al.
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ject to control by special interests concerned primarily about
reelection, unresponsive to the people and undeserving of
thanks for their public service."
These views are unfortunate, of course, and result from a
number of factors, including a low level of civic literacy and a
penchant for campaigns to bash the institutions in which they are
trying to secure their candidate's membership. This description
of legislators is also untrue, leading perhaps to the troubling
paradox of people subjectively believing that the objectively less
fair initiative system results in greater fairness than the objectively more fair representative system.67
Skepticism about legislators is not the only factor that maintains initiative systems. Even some strong critics of initiatives do
not want to repeal them. This I think has to do with Americans'
perhaps inbred distrust of government and their historical
Democratic Wish, characterized by Professor James Morone as
the wish for "direct participation of a united people pursuing a
shared communal interest."8
One recent exchange I had with an initiative state colleague
illustrates Morone's observation. This colleague told me of a variety of instances where she felt that bicameralism and several
other checks on legislative lawmaking were important and had
made a difference in issues about which she was concerned.
Conversely, she was also critical of initiatives. In what, at the
time, seemed a surprising response to my question of whether
she would favor repeal of the initiative system in her state, she
said, "Absolutely not." When I asked why, she said, "I just
couldn't give it up."
Overcoming such resistance requires more than simply
urging the elimination of direct democracy. The following discussion suggests six avenues for improving initiative processes to
reduce the effects of factions. However, regardless of the procedural benefits, legislators must be prepared for the ferocious response
that follows any suggestion to change the initiative proc69
ess.

66. THE CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN
OREGON 28 (1996).
67. See generallyE. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1-5 (1988).
68. MORONE, supra note 21, at 5.
69. One striking example of initiator ferocity comes from Arizona. Representa-
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A. Narrowing Initiative Subjects
Several states allow initiatives only for statutory amendment. At first glance, it is unseemly and threatening to allow
constitutional change through an initiative process that, for example, permits enactment based on a majority of votes. However, such a suggestion only has meaning if there is some clear
way to delineate between what is constitutional and what is
statutory-a difficult task when looking at state constitutions. A
better approach is to follow Professor Linde's suggestion that an
initiative system be used only for structural changes. If this is
too extreme, initiatives should not apply, at the very least, to local or private laws, dedicated revenues, or appropriation or tax
caps.
B. Formulatingthe Proposal
Before petitions may be circulated, states should require
sponsors to file an initiative proposal with a designated state
authority. This authority then would provide general public notice of the proposal's receipt and its contents. In addition, it
would provide specific notice to the press, elected and governmental officials, and other interested groups or individuals. This
would be followed by an opportunity for interested persons to
comment at public hearings. The sponsors would be required to
reply to those comments in person or in writing. These hearings
would become part of the public record. This system apparently
was proposed by a legislator in Arizona this year."
While this might not result in dramatic changes to the process, sponsors might moderate their views to accommodate potential supporters, particularly those who oppose the initiative
based on the sponsors' rigidity. More importantly, such notice
provides an early opportunity for the public to assess and comtive Gardner suggested that the elimination of paying bounty hunters on a persignature basis and holding hearings on all proposals would "open up the process, limit
the influence of special interests groups and give voters more information about initiatives." Chris Moeser, Recall Targets Rep. Gardner; Group Calls Him Public Enemy of
Initiatives, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 26. 1998, at B2. Following these suggestions, Gardner was labeled "an enemy to the will of the people," and recall petitions
were circulated. Id. With a flourish of self-righteousness and the hubris of Dorian
Gray, a leader of the recall movement stated, "I'm offended at the arrogance-that
[Gardner] would try to wrest this power from the people." Id.
70. Id.
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ment on the proposal. This could also reduce potential deceit by
petition circulators.
C. The PetitionProcess
Following the comment period, petitions for the proposal, in
its original or amended form, could be circulated. A substantial
signature requirement of approximately fifteen percent of all
participating voters in the last gubernatorial election should be
required. A lesser percentage would be appropriate if it is based
on the number of registered voters. Critics argue that this requirement will further increase the price of initiatives and make
them accessible only to the rich. Perhaps this is true, but the
public is not competing with the well-resourced. The wellresourced are competing with each other. Raising the percentage requirement may limit the number of ballot initiatives and
allow voters a better opportunity to understand them.
States should also require statewide geographic distribution.
As demonstrated in Tables A and B, a number of states already
have such a system in place. When the numbers are substantial,
this requirement improves the representative characteristic of
the initiative process.
These suggestions are directed toward a more deliberative
and representative initiative process. If initiatives are justified
by legislative gridlock or contribution-induced decisions contrary
to the public good, the legitimacy of such arguments should at
least be tested by a substantial number of knowledgeable voters,
not a zealous or deceived few.
Finally, to prevent fraud, instead of paying petition circulators on a per-signature basis, they should receive an hourly wage.
Owners of initiative businesses should also bear some responsibility for signature verification. States should penalize such
businesses for substantial signature failures and unprofessional
behavior by their petition circulators. Some states have proposed a licensing requirement for paid petitioners to help eliminate fraud and deception. At a minimum, states should require
paid petitioners to disclose their real names, their employer's
name, and how much they are paid.
D. Legislative Review
Once petitions have been certified, initiators should send
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their proposals to the legislature. Within a reasonable fixed
time, the proposals would be subject to whatever level of deliberation the legislature chooses to allow. Because legislators determine their own priorities, the legislature should not be required to consider an initiative. Otherwise, initiators would
control the legislative agenda. If the legislature rejects the initiative proposal by inaction or by a vote, the initiative would then
go to referendum at the next general election.
If the legislature enacts a law that amends the proposal, the
original proposal should be allowed on the ballot only if the
sponsors recirculated petitions and obtained half the number of
signatures originally required. Prior signatories could re-sign,
but all signatories would have to be informed of the legislative
action. This system would improve the process by allowing previous signatories an opportunity to validate the legislature's action by refusing to support the original proposal.
E. The Campaign
From a regulatory perspective, it is difficult to control the
nature of campaigns. However, limiting campaign contributions
and requiring disclosure of contributors are essential to the
process. The government could improve initiative campaigning
by providing more opportunities for people to understand the issues. Currently, voters' guides in most states are simply impenetrable.
F The Vote
Amending a constitution or a statute should require more
than a majority of those voting. Most legislative bodies require a
majority of the entire number of the representatives. This
maximizes representative opportunities and avoids minorityenacted laws. Groups such as the City Club of Portland argued
that requiring "the majority of registered voters [to] approve an
amendment would enable voters who fail to vote to affect the
outcome. ' , 7' This argument is unpersuasive. Why should a proposal become law without a majority consensus? The burden to
change the law should lie with the sponsors. It should not be the
public burden to stop the change.
71.

THE CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 66, at 37.
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VII. CONCLUSION

I am keenly aware of the active tense and sharpness of my
remarks. This is not simply an academic exercise. It is a small
part of an ongoing struggle to maintain our national hallmark of
representative government. The existence or exercise of direct
democracy alone will not tumble our governmental walls. But
these walls are assailable and are always under assault. As Alexander Hamilton observed, after recounting the agitated history of other democracies: "If it had been found impracticable
to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the
cause of that species of government as indefensible."" I refuse
to abandon this cause.

72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cook ed., 1961).
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Appendix
A. Requirements for Initiating and Passing Statutes
State
Alaska

Signatures Required for Balloting
10% GD73 (ALASKA CONST. art.

Votes Needed to Pass
Majority (ALASKA STAT.

11, § 3)

4 15.45.220)

Arizona

10% (Az. CONST. art. 4, Pt. 1, § 1)

Arkansas
California

8% GD (ARK. CONST. amend. 7)
5% (CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 8)

Majority (Id.)
Majority (Id.)
Majority (Id. § 10)

Colorado

5% (COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 1)

Majority (Id.)

Idaho

6% 7 GD (IDAHO CONST. art. III,

Majority (IDAHO CODE

§ 1; id. 4 34-1805)

§ 34-1804)

10% (ME. CONST. art. 4, Pt. 3,

Majority (Id.)

Maine

§ 18)
Massachusetts

3% + 5%5 (MASS. CONST. amend.
XLVIII, Pt. 5, § 1)

3% & majority

Michigan

8% (MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9)

Majority (Id.)

Missouri

5% (Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 50)
5% (MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4)

Montana

6

Majority (Id. § 51)
Majority (MONT. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, ch. 27,

§ 204)
Nebraska

7%7" (NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2)

Majority and not less
than 35% of total votes
cast (Id. § 4)

Nevada

Majority (Id.)

North Dakota

10% (NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2)
2% (N.D. CONST. art. III, § 4)

Ohio

3% (OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1B)

Majority (Id. § 8)
Majority (Id.)

73. In Alaska, before a petition can be circulated, an application bearing the signatures of at least 100 qualified voters must be submitted. See ALASKA STAT. §
15.45.030 (1997).
74. Idaho requires 20 qualified electors to sign an application before a petition can
be circulated. See IDAHO CODE § 34-1804 (1997).
75. Massachusetts has a system in which, before the initiative is placed on the
ballot, the legislature has an opportunity to enact the initiative proposal. If the initiative proposal is not enacted and if an additional .5% of signatures are secured, it is
placed on the ballot. See MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, Pt. 5, § 1.
76. The majority must equal 30% of the total votes cast. See MASS. CONST. art.
IXVIII, Pt. 5, § 1.
77. For an initiative to pass in Nebraska, it must receive a majority of the votes
cast but not less than 35% of the votes cast at the election. See NEB. CONST. art. III, §
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State
Oklahoma

Signatures Required for Balloting
8% (OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2)

Votes Needed to Pass
Majority (Id. § 3)

Oregon
South Dakota

6% (OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1)
5% (S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 1; S.D.
COD. LAWS § 2-1-1)

Majority (Id. § 1)
Majority (S.D. COD.
LAWS § 2-1-1)

Utah

10% (UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 1;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201)
8% (WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 1;

Majority (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 20A-7-201)

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

29.79.120)
15% (WYo. CONsT. art. 3, § 52)

Wyoming

Majority (WASH. CONST.
art. 2, § 1)
Majority of all (Id.;
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2223-1004)

B. Requirements for Initiating and Passing
Constitutional Amendments
State
Arizona

Signatures Required for Balloting
15% (Az. CONST. art. 4, Pt. 1, § 1)

Votes Needed to Pass
Majority (Id.)
Majority (Id.)

California
Colorado

10% GD (ARK. CONST. amend.
7)
8% (CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 8)
5% (COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 1)

Florida

8%78 GD (FLA, CONST. art. 11)

Majority (Id.)

Illinois

8% (ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3)

Massachusetts

3%' (MASS. CONST. amend.

3/5 of those voting on
amendment or majority
of those voting in election
(1d.)
6% & majority (Id. § 5)

Arkansas

Majority (Id. § 10)
Majority (Id.)

XLVIII, Pt. 4, § 2)
Michigan

10% (MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2)

Majority (Id.)

78. Florida's signature requirement is based on the preceding presidential election. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
79. See MASS. CONST. art. IXVIII, Pt. 4, § 5.
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Mississippi'

Signatures Required for Balloting
12% (MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273)

Missouri

8% (Mo. CONST. art. 3,

Montana

10% (MONT. CONST. art. XIV,

Nebraska

§ 9)
10% (NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2)

Nevada

10% (NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2)

Majority (Id.)

North Dakota

4% (N.D. CONST. art. II1, § 9)

Majority (Id. §§ 8, 9)

Ohio

10% (OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1A)

Majority (Id. § 1B)

Oklahoma

15 % (OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2)

Majority (Id. § 3)

Oregon

8% (OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1)

Majority (Id.; OR. CONST.
art. XVII, § 1)

South Dakota

10% (S.D. CONST. art. 23, § 1)

Majority (S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS 4 2-1-12)

§ 50)

Votes Needed to Pass
Majority8 (Id.)
Majority (Id. § 51)
Majority (Id.)
Majority and not less
than 35% of total votes
cast (Id. § 4)

80. Mississippi requires initiative amendments to the constitution to be sent to the
legislature for enactment. If not enacted, they then are placed on the ballot. See Miss.
CONST. art. IV, § 273(6).
81. For an initiative to pass in Mississippi, it must receive a majority of the votes
cast but not less than 40% of the votes cast at the election. See id. § 273(6).

